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This paper studies the determinants of college attendance in Mexico. I use subjective quantitative
expectations of future earnings to analyze both the causes and the implications of the steep income gradient
in higher-education enrollment. In particular, I examine whether data on individuals' expected returns to
college as well as on their perceived earnings risk can improve our understanding of heterogeneity in college
attendance choices. I ¯nd that while expected returns and perceived risk from human capital investment
are important determinants, lower returns or higher risk are not su±cient, alone, to explain the poor's low
attendance rates. I also ¯nd that poor individuals require signi¯cantly higher expected returns to be induced
to attend college, implying that they face signi¯cantly higher costs than individuals with wealthy parents.
I then test predictions of a simple model of college attendance choice in the presence of credit constraints,
using parental income and wealth as a proxy for the household's (unobserved) interest rate. I ¯nd that
poor individuals with high expected returns are particularly responsive to changes in direct costs such as
tuition, which is consistent with credit constraints playing an important role. To evaluate potential welfare
implications of introducing a means-tested student loan program, I apply the Local Instrumental Variables
approach of Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) to my model of college attendance choice. I ¯nd that a sizeable
fraction of poor individuals would change their decision in response to a reduction in the interest rate, and
that the individuals at the margin have higher expected returns than the individuals already attending
college. This suggests that policies such as governmental student loan programs could lead to large welfare
gains.
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In both developed and developing countries there is a strong association between children's college
attendance rates and parental income. For example, in the U.S. the poorest 40% of the relevant
age group (18 to 24 years old) represent around 20% of the student body, while the richest 20%
constitute 45%. For Mexico, the country I will be studying in this paper, the poorest 40% represent
only 8% of the student body, which is low even compared to other Latin American countries, while
the richest 20% constitute 60% of the student body. In addition overall college enrollment is
particularly low in Mexico.1 In this paper I use subjective quantitative expectations of future
earnings to analyze both the causes and the implications of the steep income gradient in college
attendance. In particular, I examine whether data on individuals' expected returns to college as
well as on their perceived risk from human capital investment can improve our understanding of
heterogeneity in college attendance decisions.
A traditional explanation for the income gradient in college attendance is credit constraints.
Suppose that credit markets are imperfect in that banks only lend to individuals with collateral.
Since college attendance involves direct costs (such as tuition), individuals from poor families,
unable to cover such costs with parental income or with borrowed funds due to lack of collateral,
will choose not to attend college even in the presence of high expected returns.2
An alternative explanation for the gradient is that it may be optimal for poor individuals not to
attend college even if they could borrow to ¯nance higher education because of low expected returns
from human capital investment. Several papers in the literature, such as Cameron and Heckman
(1998, 2001) and Carneiro and Heckman (2002), attribute di®erences in college attendance rates
between poor and rich in the US to di®erences in \college readiness". As stated in Carneiro and
Heckman (2002), \most of the family income gap in enrollment is due to long-run factors that
produce abilities needed to bene¯t from participation in college." They disprove the importance of
credit constraints in the U.S. by showing that once one controls for ability and parental background
measures (which proxy for returns to college and preferences), parental income at the time of college
attendance ceases to have a signi¯cant e®ect on college attendance. I cannot show this in my
data. Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude that this proves the importance of credit
constraints.
1A strong correlation between children's educational attainment and parental resources is well-documented for
most countries, see e.g. the cross-country overview of Blossfeldt and Shavit (1993). The correlation is particularly
strong for developing countries, see e.g. Behrman, Gaviria and Szekely (2002) for the case of Latin America. See Table
1 in which I compare several Latin American countries (and the US and an OECD average) in terms of attendance
rates, inequality in access to higher education, and availability of fellowship and student loan programs.
2Conventionally, an individual is de¯ned as credit constrained if she would be willing to write a contract in which
she could credibly commit to paying back the loan (\enslave herself in the case of default") taking into account the
riskiness of future income streams and of default. But because such contracts are illegal, banks may choose to lend
only to individuals who o®er collateral to be seized in case of default.
2Consider the conventional model of educational choices under uncertainty. In such a model, the
college attendance choice depends on expected returns and risk from investing in college education,
preferences, and potential credit constraints. The identi¯cation challenge is that all these deter-
minants are typically unobserved by the econometrician (see, e.g., Manski (2004) and Cunha and
Heckman (2007)). This paper aims at improving our understanding of college attendance decisions
and contributing to the debate about the causes of the steep income gradient by making use of
a particularly suitable data set containing information on individuals' subjective expectations of
earnings and perceived earnings risk.
The existing literature derives measures of earnings expectations using earnings realizations.
This approach has at least two problems. First, one has to make assumptions about the individ-
ual's information set as well as the mechanisms behind expectation formation. These assumptions
include whether earnings shocks were anticipated at the time of the choice (which is particularly
problematic if large and unpredictable earnings shocks are the norm, as they are in developing
countries) and whether people have precise information about their own ability. Second, comput-
ing expected returns to college requires constructing expected earnings in a counterfactual state.
Thus, researchers have to make assumptions about how individuals form these expectations, i.e.
whether and how they solve the problem that the observed earnings are from individuals who have
self-selected into schooling. Another potentially important determinant of college attendance is
perceived earnings risk. Taking into account earnings risk is relevant for the credit constraints
issue, as it might not be optimal for poor individuals to attend college, despite high expected re-
turns, if they face particularly risky college earnings.3 Most papers in the literature neglect the
importance of risk as a determinant of educational choice and assume no uncertainty or certainty
equivalence (see, e.g., Cameron and Taber (2004) and Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)).
If there are di®erences in expected returns or perceived earnings risk, which are correlated with
parental income, this could lead to a spurious positive correlation between parental income and
college attendance. Having data on each individual's distribution of future earnings for both college
attendance states enables me to address this concern directly. Since what matters for the college
attendance decision is each individual's perception of her own skills and how these skills a®ect her
future earnings, these data ideally provide respondent's earnings expectations and perceptions of
earnings risk conditional on their information sets at the time of the decision.
One of the paper's main ¯ndings is that expected returns to college and perceived risk of future
earnings are important determinants of college attendance decisions, but that lower returns or
higher risk are not su±cient to explain the poor's low college attendance rates. I also ¯nd that poor
individuals require signi¯cantly higher expected returns to be induced to attend college, implying
3Papers that take into account this determinant include Padula and Pistaferri (2001) and Belzil and Hansen (2002).
Only the former paper employs subjective expectations but aggregates perceived employment risk for education groups
to analyze whether the implicit return to education is underestimated when not taking into account e®ects of di®erent
schooling levels on later earnings and employment risk.
3that they face signi¯cantly higher costs than individuals with wealthy parents. To understand
the role of di®erent cost components, I test predictions of a simple model of college attendance
choice in the presence of credit constraints, using parental income and wealth as proxies for the
unobserved household's interest rate. I ¯nd that poor individuals with high expected returns are
particularly responsive to changes in direct costs such as tuition, which is consistent with credit
constraints playing an important role. To evaluate potential welfare implications of introducing a
means-tested student loan program, I apply the Local Instrumental Variables (LIV) approach of
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) to my model of college attendance choice making use of subjective
expectations. I ¯nd that a sizeable fraction of poor individuals would change their decision in
response to a reduction in the interest rate, and that the individuals at the margin have higher
expected returns than the individuals already attending college.
My results indicate that there is a notable fraction of poor individuals with high expected
returns, who are at the margin of attending college, but who do not attend. This ¯nding is
suggestive of credit constraints for poor individuals, as these individuals lack resources and face
high ¯nancing costs, or are completely prevented from borrowing, due to their lack of collateral.
Thus credit constraints could be one of the driving forces of Mexico's large inequalities in access
to higher education and low overall enrollment rates. Mexico's low government funding for student
loans and fellowships for higher education, which is low even by Latin American standards, is
consistent with this view. The results of my policy experiments suggest that the introduction of
a means-tested student loan program could lead to large welfare gains by removing obstacles to
human capital accumulation and fostering Mexico's development and growth.
It is important to note that the evidence above could be consistent with other factors also driving
the poor's low college attendance rates. However, even if only some of the empirical patterns found
in the data were driven by credit constraints, this would still imply scope for policy interventions.
Furthermore, government policies such as student loan programs might still be recommendable if
the steep income gradient mostly re°ects heterogeneity in time preferences, for example. This could
be the case if there are externalities from college attendance and social returns are correlated with
private returns or if people have time-inconsistent preferences, e.g. they become more patient when
getting older.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives background information on college attendance
rates and costs and ¯nancing of college attendance in Mexico. Section 3 describes the survey data
and the data on educational costs. Section 4 provides ¯rst evidence that the data is informative
and illustrates that expected returns to college and perceived risk of future earnings are important
determinants of college attendance decisions. Section 5 describes the model of college attendance
choice and the use of the data on expected earnings, while section 6 estimates the cumulative
distribution function of costs of college attendance and presents evidence that poor individuals
face signi¯cantly higher costs. Section 7 derives and tests predictions of the model such as excess
4responsiveness of individuals, who face higher interest rates, to changes in direct costs. Section 8
shows how the LIV methodology can be used to derive \marginal" expected returns and to perform
policy experiments, and evaluates potential welfare e®ects of a means-tested student loan program.
Section 9 concludes.
2 Background Information on College Enrollment and on Costs
and Financing of College Attendance in Mexico
In 2004 around 22% of adolescents of the relevant age group (18 to 24 years) were attending college
in Mexico to receive an undergraduate degree (\licenciatura") (ANUIES, annual statistics 2004),
which is signi¯cantly lower than in many other Latin American countries (see table 1). Mexico is
characterized by large inequalities in access to college education for di®erent income groups. In
comparison to several other Latin American countries, such as Colombia, Argentina and Chile, only
Brazil has a smaller fraction of poor students attending college (see table 1). Figure 1, which is
based on the author's calculation using the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS, 2003), displays
college attendance rates of 18 to 24 year old high school graduates {thus already a selective group,
as only about 54% of the relevant age group attain a high school degree{ for di®erent parental
income quartiles measured in the last year before the college attendance decision. The attendance
rate of individuals in the lowest parental income quartile is around 22% compared to 67% for
the highest parental income quartile. The \Jovenes con Oportunidades" sample (2005) used in this
paper consists of high school graduates from Oportunidades families and is thus only representative
of about the poorest third of the high school graduate population (see section 3). The positive
correlation between parental income and college attendance rate can also be found for this sample,
but di®erences between poorest quartile (17%) and richest quartile (35%) are smaller, as every
individual in the sample is relatively poor (see ¯gure 2, Jovenes con Oportunidades 2005).
College attendance costs in Mexico pocket a large fraction of parental income for relatively
poor families. Costs consist of enrollment and tuition fees, fees for (entrance) exams and other
bureaucratic costs, health insurance (mandatory for some universities), costs for schooling materi-
als such as books, costs for transport and/or room and board. I collected data on the two most
important cost factors, tuition/enrollment costs and costs of living. Administrative data on tu-
ition and enrollment fees per year from the National Association of Universities and Institutes of
Higher Education (ANUIES) reveals a large degree of heterogeneity: Yearly tuition and enrollment
costs vary between 50 pesos (\Universidad Aut¶ onoma de Guerrero", Guerrero) and 120,000 pesos
(\Tecnol¶ ogico de Monterrey", I.T.E.S.M. - Campus Puebla), which is equivalent to approximately
5 and 12,000 US$. The tuition cost measure that I use in my analysis is the minimum yearly
tuition/enrollment fee of universities in the closest locality with at least one university (see section
3.3). Forty percent of the high school graduates face (minimum) tuition costs of over 750 pesos,
5which is equivalent to about 15% of median yearly per capita parental income. The other important
cost factor depends on whether the adolescent has to move to a di®erent city and pay room and
board or whether a university is close to the location of residence, so that she can commute while
taking advantage of the economies of scale of living with her family. I therefore construct a measure
of distance to the closest university for each individual (see section 3.3).
In Mexico funding for higher-education fellowships and student loan programs is very limited
and only about 5% of the undergraduate student population receive fellowships, while 2% receive
student loans, which is low even compared to other Latin American countries (see table 1). The
national scholarship program PRONABES was created in 2001 with the goal of more equal access
to higher education at the undergraduate level. In 2005 funding of PRONABES amounted to
850 million pesos (equal to 40 US$ per student per year) and 5% of the undergraduate student
population received a fellowship (\beca") in 2005 compared to 2% in 2001/02 (see Department of
Public Education(SEP)), 2005). Eligibility for a fellowship is subject to a maximum level of family
income (less than three times the minimum monthly salary, in special cases less than four times), a
minimum GPA (8.0) and having been accepted at a public university or technical institute. After
each year, the student has to prove that economic eligibility criteria are still met and that she is
in good academic standing. In 2004/05 the fellowship consisted of a monthly stipend of 750 pesos
{slightly more than half the minimum wage per month{ in the ¯rst year of studies, and increased
to 1000 pesos in the fourth year of studies. Student loan programs are also of minor importance in
Mexico. Only about 2% of the national student population bene¯t from a student loan, which is
low even compared to poorer Latin American countries, such as Colombia (9%) and Brazil (6%). In
Mexico there are four di®erent programs that o®er student loans: the largest student loan program
SOFES was implemented by a collaboration of private universities and is need-and-merit based, but
students with collateral are preferred. This program o®ers loans to 1.5% of students. In addition
there are three other very small state programs, ICEES in Sonora state, ICEET in Tamaulipas,
and Educa¯n in Guanajuato.
3 Data Description
3.1 Survey Data
The survey \Jovenes con Oportunidades" was conducted in fall 2005 on a sample of about 23,000
15 to 25 year old adolescents in urban Mexico.4 The sample was collected to evaluate the program
4Attanasio and Kaufmann (2007) use the same data set to perform diverse internal and external validity tests
of the data on individuals' expectations of earnings, comparing moments of the individual earnings distributions for
di®erent groups {e.g. in terms of age and education of the respondent, ability and parental income{, and comparing
cross-sections of expected earnings for di®erent schooling degrees with cross-sections of earnings realizations using
the Mexican Census (2000) and the MxFLS (2003). Lastly, they show that measures of subjective expectations are
signi¯cant predictors of college and high school attendance choices, and provide some preliminary evidence that poor
6\Jovenes con Oportunidades", which was introduced in 2002/03 and which gives cash incentives to
individuals to attend high school (\Educacion Media Superior") and get a high school degree.
Thus primary sampling units are individuals, who are eligible for this program, that is students
who are in their last year of junior high school (9th grade) or are attending high school (10 to 12th
grade), who are younger than 22 years of age, and whose families are Oportunidades bene¯ciaries
in urban Mexico.5 As this paper analyzes the college attendance decision, I restrict the sample
to 18/19 year old high school graduates, who either start to work (or look for work) or decide to
attend college. The sample size is thus reduced to 3680 individuals.
The survey consists of a family questionnaire and a questionnaire for each 15 to 25 year old
adolescent in the household. The data comprises detailed information on demographic charac-
teristics of the young adults, their schooling levels and histories, their junior high school GPA,
and detailed information on their parental background and the household they live in, such as
parental education, earnings and income of each household member, assets of the household and
transfers/remittances to and from the household. In addition the data contains information about
individuals' subjective expectations of earnings as discussed next.
The survey contains a module that was designed to elicit information on the individual distrib-
ution of future earnings and the probability of working for di®erent scenarios of highest completed
schooling degree. After showing the respondent a scale from zero to one hundred to explain the
concept of probabilities and going over a simple example, the following four questions on earnings
expectations and employment probabilities were asked:
1. Each high school graduate was asked about the probability of working conditional on two
di®erent scenarios of highest schooling degree:
Assume that you ¯nish High School (College), and that this is your highest schooling degree.
From zero to one hundred, how certain are you that you will be working at the age of 25?
2. The questions on subjective expectations of earnings are:
Assume that you ¯nish High School (College), and that this is your highest schooling degree.
Assume that you have a job at age 25.
(a) What do you think is the maximum amount you can earn per month at that age?
(b) What do you think is the minimum amount you can earn per month at that age?
(c) From zero to one hundred, what is the probability that your earnings at that age will be
at least x?
individuals might be credit constrained. This paper investigates this latter issue in detail by testing predictions of a
model of college attendance choice in the presence of credit constraints and performing policy experiments.
5The age of the individuals of the sample varies between 15 and 25, because the sample also includes the siblings
of the primary sampling units.
7x is the midpoint between maximum and minimum amount elicited from questions (a) and
(b) and was calculated by the interviewer and read to the respondent.
3.2 Calculation of Expected Earnings, Perceived Earnings Risk, and Expected
Gross Returns to College
In this section, I brie°y describe how the answers to the three survey questions (2(a)-(c)) (see
preceding section) are used to compute moments of the individual earnings distributions and ex-
pected gross returns to college (compare Guiso, Japelli and Pistaferri (2002) and Attanasio and
Kaufmann (2007)). As a ¯rst step, I am interested in the individual distribution of future earn-
ings f(Y S) for both scenarios of college attendance choice, where S = 0 (S = 1) denotes having
a high school degree (college degree) as the highest degree. The survey provides information for
each individual on the support of the distribution [yS
min;yS
max] and on the probability mass to the
right of the midpoint, yS
mid = (yS
min + yS
max)=2, of the support, Pr
¡





Thus I need to make a distributional assumption, f(¢), in order to be able to calculate moments of
these individual earnings distributions. In this paper, I assume a triangular distribution (see ¯gure
3), which is more plausible than a stepwise uniform distribution as it puts less weight on extreme
values. The ¯rst moment of the individual distribution is extremely robust with respect to the
underlying distributional assumption (see Attanasio and Kaufmann (2007) for more details on the
triangular distribution, alternative distributional assumptions and robustness checks).
Thus I can express expected earnings and variance of earnings for schooling degrees S = 0;1
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and I can thus calculate expected (gross) returns to college as:6
½ ´ E(return to college) = E(ln(Y 1)) ¡ E(ln(Y 0)):
There is a considerable amount of heterogeneity in expected gross returns to college: the ¯fth
percentile of the expected return is ½0:05 = 0:18 compared to the ninety-¯fth percentile of ½0:95 =
6This is just an approximation. In my theoretical model college choice is determined by a comparison of the
expected present value of earnings in both college attendance states net of direct costs of college.
81:36. In addition, the following evidence suggests that expected returns are an important factor
in individuals' college choice and that self-selection based on expected returns is important to take
into account: the median expected gross return for high school graduates deciding to attend college
is 0.66 compared to 0.60 for those, who decide to stop school after high school. A value of expected
gross returns of 0.66 implies that expected college earnings are approximately 93% larger than
expected high school earnings for individuals, who attend college.
To convince the reader of the validity of these measures of subjective expectations before using
them in any further analysis, I show in section 4 that the expected return, the probability of working
and the perceived risk of earnings in the two college attendance states are important determinants
of college attendance choices even after controlling for an extensive list of individual and family
background characteristics.
3.3 Data on Educational Costs
The previous subsection describes the calculation of expected gross returns. In addition it is
important to have information on the direct costs of college attendance that people face to analyze
their choices. Therefore I collected data on tuition costs and distance to college, which I will discuss
in this section. In addition I will discuss the creation of measures capturing the ¯nancial situation
of the high school graduate's family (survey data).
I use administrative data on tuition and enrollment fees per year from the National Association
of Universities and Institutes of Higher Education (ANUIES).7 In the following analysis I am using
the following measure of tuition (and enrollment) costs: I determine the locality with universities
that is closest to the adolescent's locality of residence (as described in the following paragraph),
and then use the lowest tuition fee of all the universities/technical institutes that o®er a four-year
bachelor program in the relevant locality. Forty percent of adolescents face (minimum) tuition costs
above 750 pesos, which is equivalent to 15% of median per capita parental income |while only
representing a fraction of total college attendance costs|, and thus college attendance would imply
a substantial ¯nancial burden for poor families.
Another important determinant of college attendance costs is the accessibility of universities
(compare, e.g., Card (1995) and Cameron and Taber (2004)): costs can di®er substantially depend-
ing on how far the adolescent lives away from the closest university. If she lives far away and thus
has to move to a di®erent city and pay room and board, this will be an important additional cost
factor. Therefore, I collected information on the location of higher education institutions o®ering
undergraduate degrees from the web page of the Department of Public Education (SEP). I deter-
mined the actual distance between the adolescent's locality of residence and the closest locality with
7The information I use to create a dataset of tuition costs is from ANUIES Catalogue of undergraduate degrees
at universities and technical institutes 2004 (\Catalogo de Carreras de Licenciatura en Universidades e Institutos
Tecnologicos 2004", see http://www.anuies.mx/).
9higher education institutions using geo-code data on all relevant localities from the National Insti-
tute of Statistics, Geography and Information (INEGI) of Mexico.8 About half of the adolescents
live within a distance of 20 kilometers to the closest university, a distance that seems possible to
commute daily with public transportation. Twenty-¯ve percent of the adolescents live at a distance
of between 20 and 40 kilometers, while the other quarter lives more than 40 kilometers away from
the closest locality with universities.
Financing costs depend mainly on parental income and wealth, which determine the availability
of resources {with opportunity costs of foregone savings{ and the ability to collateralize and receive
loans. The survey provides detailed information on income of each household member, savings if
existent (only a very selective and richer group of households saves or borrows {4% of households
have savings, while 5% borrow), durables and remittances. I create the following two measures: per
capita parental income and an index of parental income and wealth. Per capita parental income
includes parents' labor earnings, other income sources such as rent, pro¯ts from a business, pension
income etc. and remittances, divided by family size. Median yearly per capita income is 5370
pesos (approximately 537 US$). The index of parental income and wealth is created by a principle
component analysis of per capita income, value of durable goods and savings.
As I do not expect a linear e®ect of income and wealth on the ability to borrow, I add the
measures in the form of dummies and use absolute thresholds for the parental income measure, as
for the question of credit constraints absolute poverty in interaction with direct costs of schooling
matters. For the indicator of parental income and wealth without natural unit, I use quartiles. I
use the following per capita parental income thresholds: less than 5,000 pesos yearly (equivalent
to 44% of the sample), between 5,000 and 10,000 pesos (34%), and more than 10,000 pesos (22%)
of yearly per capita income. The reason for using these income thresholds is their approximate
correspondence with eligibility requirements for receiving a fellowship. Therefore I can analyze
whether eligibility for fellowships has an e®ect on college attendance. Nevertheless one should
keep in mind that fellowships are quantitatively not very important: only 5% of the undergraduate
student population received a fellowship in 2004 (see section 2). I use per capita income thresholds
that are approximately equivalent to less than two times the minimum wage (less than 5,000 pesos
per capita income yearly) {which are supposed to be the primary bene¯ciaries of the PRONABES
fellowship{, and to between two and four times the minimum wage (between 5,000 and 10,000 pesos
per capita income), while individuals with income of more than four times the minimum wage are
not eligible.
8I use information on the location of public and private universities and technical institutes o®ering undergrad-
uate degrees from the Department of Public Education (SEP, Secretaria de Educacion Publica - Subsecretaria Ed-
ucacion Superior), http://ses4.sep.gob.mx/. I extracted geo-code information of all adolescents' localities of resi-
dence (around 1300) and of all localities with at least one university {in the states of our sample and in all neigh-
boring states{ from a web page provided by INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geogra¯a e Informatica),
http://www.inegi.gob.mx/geo/default.aspx. My special thanks to Shaun McRae who helped extracting this data.
103.4 Two Survey Data Issues
3.4.1 Timing of the Survey
One important remark about the timing of the survey and the college attendance decision: One
might be surprised about the fact that the following analysis {which requires knowledge of earnings
expectations as well as of the actual college attendance decision{ is possible with just one single
cross-section. The Jovenes survey was conducted in October/November 2005 and thus two or three
months after college had started.
To use this survey for the following analysis I have to make the assumption that individuals'
information sets have not changed during this short period or have changed, but left expectations
unchanged. The following two arguments support the assumption that during this period there
has been no arrival of new information that changed earnings expectations: ¯rst, individuals learn
about their ability relative to their peers before their attendance decision in July/August, because
of entrance tests to college in February/March or in June/July, which individuals have to take to be
admitted. Results of these tests are made public before the actual college attendance decision.9 It
is unlikely that individuals will learn signi¯cantly more about their ability in the ¯rst two or three
months at university in addition to what they learned from their relative results at entrance exams.
Second, additional learning about future college earnings has been shown to happen in the last
year(s) of college (see Betts (1996) for evidence on the US) and not in the ¯rst few months. This
is supported by evidence from my data: there is no signi¯cant di®erence in the cross-sections of
expected returns to college for students, who just started college, compared to the one of students
who are in their second year. On the other hand, return distributions are signi¯cantly di®erent for
students in higher years.
An additional potential concern is the behavioral response that individuals try to rationalize
their choice two or three months later, i.e. individuals, who decided to attend college, rationalize
their choice by stating higher expected college earnings (and/or lower expected high school earn-
ings), and those, who decided not to attend, state lower expected college and higher high school
earnings. To address this concern, I use the cross-section of earnings expectations of a cohort that
is one year younger (just starting grade 12) as a counterfactual distribution for the cross-sectional
distribution of expected earnings of my high school graduate sample before they had to decide
about college attendance. I ¯nd no signi¯cant di®erence between the distributions of expected
earnings of the two cohorts (Kolmogoro®-Smirnov test on equality of the distributions. See also
¯gures 11 and 12 in Appendix C).
9Individuals can and usually do take entrance tests at several universities and if they are not admitted, they can
continue to take tests at other universities.
113.4.2 Potential Sample Selection Problem
The interviewer visited the primary sampling units and their families in October and November
2005 and interviewed the household head or spouse using the family questionnaire and the high
school graduate using the \Jovenes" questionnaire. In cases, in which the adolescent was not
present, the household head or spouse also answered the \Jovenes" questionnaire. This mistakenly
included the subjective expectations module, which was supposed to be answered by the adolescent
directly. Therefore, the question on expected earnings was not answered by the adolescent herself for
about half the sample of high school graduates. Table 2 compares summary statistics of important
variables for the two groups of respondents. College attendance rates are signi¯cantly lower in
the case that the adolescent responds, which raises concerns about sample selection in the case of
using only adolescent respondents. Individuals who attend college {in particular if they live far
from the closest university{ are less likely to be at home at the time of the interview. Sample
selection can {at least partially{ be explained by observable variables: adolescent respondents live
signi¯cantly closer to the closest university, are signi¯cantly more likely to be female (as many
families do not want their female children to live on their own away from home) and have lower per
capita household expenditures. On the other hand, variables such as expected returns to college as
well as ability, father's years of schooling and per capita parental income do not di®er signi¯cantly
between the two groups.
I address the concern of potential sample selection in two ways: First, I use the full sample of
both respondents, which is reasonable assuming that information sets and expectations of parents
and their children are correlated (compare Attanasio and Kaufmann (2007), who show that the
expectations of siblings are highly correlated and that {as a within-family comparison{ siblings with
higher than average GPA also have higher than average expected earnings and returns to college).
Second, I use only the adolescent respondents and correct for sample selection by estimating jointly
a latent index model for college attendance and a sample selection equation. As an exclusion
restriction I use information on the date and time of the interview, which are strongly signi¯cant
determinants of whether the respondent is the adolescent (see next section). Both approaches
lead to very similar results, while sample selection on unobservables does not seem an important
problem (the correlation between the error terms of the two equations is not signi¯cantly di®erent
from zero.) While I remain agnostic about who is the decision-maker, results are consistent with
joint decision-making of parents and their child {the high school graduate{ and with correlated
information sets, as both approaches described above lead to very similar results.
124 College Attendance Decisions, Expected Returns to College and
First Evidence on Credit Constraints
The goal of this section is twofold: before introducing a simple model of college attendance choice
in the next section, I ¯rst provide evidence that the data on subjective expectations is informative.
I show that individuals' expected returns to college, probabilities of work and perceived earnings
risks in both college attendance states are important factors in their college attendance decisions.
As a second step, I show that even after controlling for these important determinants {in addi-
tion to measures used in the existing literature on credit constraints such as parental background
and ability{, parental income at the time of the college attendance decision remains a signi¯cant
predictor of the college attendance choice.
To analyze the determinants of college attendance choices, I estimate the following latent index
model, in which an individual chooses college if
S = 1 , S¤ = ®1+¯1Exp Return+°1SProb of WorkS+°1SVar of Log EarnS+·1X+U1 ¸ 0; (1)
and the choice depends on the expected return, the probability of work and the perceived risk of
earnings in both college attendance states, S, and controls, X, such as a variety of individual and
parental background characteristics as described later.
I address the potential sample selection problem (see previous section) in two ways: ¯rst I
estimate equation (1) for the full sample, and second, I use only the adolescent sample and correct
for sample selection by adding a sample selection equation, determining whether the respondent is
the adolescent, R = 1 (assuming that S is observed only when R = 1):
R = 1 , R¤ = ®2 + ·2X + ¸2Z + U2 ¸ 0; (2)
and estimate both equations jointly, assuming that the latent errors, (U1;U2), are bivariate normal
and independent of the explanatory variables with a zero-mean normal distribution and unit vari-
ances. As an exclusion restriction I use the time and date of the interview, Z, that is week of the
year, day, time of the day and interactions between day and time of the day when the interview
was conducted, which are strongly signi¯cant predictors. As results are very similar in both cases,
I will only present and discuss results of the full sample (for results using the adolescent sample,
see Appendix C).
Expected returns, the probability of working and the perceived earnings risk are important
determinants of the college attendance decision. Table 3 illustrates that expected (gross) returns
to college have a highly signi¯cantly positive e®ect on the college attendance decision. The stated
probabilities of working have the expected signs, that is a higher probability of having a job with
a high school degree decreases the likelihood of attending college (not signi¯cant), while an in-
crease in the probability of working with a college degree signi¯cantly increases the likelihood of
attendance. A higher perceived risk of college earnings signi¯cantly decreases the probability of
13attending college. The e®ect of expected returns is highly signi¯cant and similar in magnitude
across all speci¯cations (see also tables 4 to 6 in section 7), while the e®ect of the probability of
work and the perceived earnings risk is less robust. Therefore, the main focus of the following
analysis will be on expected returns.
Controlling for ability and parental background {conventionally used to capture di®erences in
returns{ shows that expected returns, probabilities of work and perceived risks are correlated with
these measures (see smaller coe±cient on expected returns in model 2 compared to model 1 in
table 3), but that subjective expectations continue to play a signi¯cant role in determining college
attendance decisions. One advantage of being able to control for expected returns directly is due to
the multi-dimensionality of skills that can hardly be captured even with good data on test scores,
while the individual has idiosyncratic knowledge about these skills. More importantly, what matters
for the individual's decision is her perception of her skills and her beliefs about how they a®ect
future earnings conditional on her information set at the time of the college attendance decision,
which provides a strong rationale for using \perceived" returns.
At the same time, measures of ability/school performance such as junior high school GPA
and parental education are strong predictors of college attendance after controlling for earnings
expectations, suggesting a very important role for preferences for education (see model 2 of table
3).10 In addition these measure are likely to also capture the probability of completing college.
With subjective expectations, I can address the question whether parental income is signi¯cant,
only because it picks up di®erences in earnings expectations and perceived risk between poor and
rich individuals. I ¯nd that per capita parental income at the time of the college attendance
decision is still an important and signi¯cant determinant after controlling for earnings expectations
and proxies for preferences (see table 3).11 Thus parental income does not only have an e®ect on
college attendance through its' e®ect on expected returns to college or on perceived earnings risk.
This is stronger suggestive evidence for a role of credit constraints than in conventional approaches,
but could also be due to unobserved heterogeneity in preferences between rich and poor individuals.
The goals of the next sections are as follows: the ¯rst goal is to gain a better understanding of
the causes for the di®erences in college enrollment rates between poor and rich individuals and to
10I use GPA terciles, because schools do not use a standardized junior high school exam, so that GPA scores of
di®erent schools are not perfectly comparable, while a ranking based on GPA terciles is likely to be more meaningful.
Results are very similar using mother's education, but there are even fewer mothers with high education than fathers,
in particular very few with college education.
11I only report results using dummies for per capita parental income (see data section 3.3), while results using
quartiles of the index for parental income and wealth are very similar (see Appendix C). I could in principle also
control for per capita expenditures as a measure of longer-run (permanent) family income. The expenditure measure
has the very important drawback that it contains schooling expenditures including those for the high school graduates
who chose to attend college. Unfortunately it is impossible to separately identify which part of the costs is attributable
to the high school graduate instead of her siblings. Adding per capita expenditures to table 3 does not signi¯cantly
change results, in particular per capita parental income and the subjective expectations measures remain signi¯cant
predictors (results from the author upon request).
14analyze whether credit constraints might play an important role. The second goal is to evaluate
potential welfare implications of policies, such as the introduction of a student loan program, which
aim at increasing college attendance of the poor. To derive testable predictions about heterogeneity
in interest rates that households face and to perform counterfactual policy experiments, I ¯rst
introduce a simple model of college attendance choice and show how I make use of the data on
earnings expectations in this model.
5 Model of College Attendance Choice
I model the college attendance decision based on the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 Credit constraints are modeled as unobserved heterogeneity in interest rates, ri.
One special case would be two di®erent interests rates, one for the group of credit constrained
individuals, rCC, and one for the group of individuals that is not constrained, rNC, with rCC > rNC.
In the literature heterogeneity of credit access has often been modeled as a person-speci¯c rate of
interest (see, e.g., Becker (1967), Willis and Rosen (1979) and Card (1995)). This approach has
the unattractive feature that a high lifetime r implies high returns to savings after labor market
entry. The testable prediction that I derive from this model (see next section) {that is excess
responsiveness of poor individuals with respect to changes in costs{ is robust with respect to this
assumption, as it can also be derived, for example, from Cameron and Taber's model (2004), who
use a similar framework, but assume that constrained individuals face higher borrowing rates than
unconstrained individuals during school, but face the same (lower) borrowing rate once individuals
graduate.
Assumption 2 The problem is in¯nite horizon.
Assumption 3 Log earnings are additively separable in education and years of post-schooling ex-
perience. Individuals enter the labor market with zero experience and experience is increasing
deterministically, Xi(a+1) = Xia + 1, until retirement. Returns to experience are the same in both
schooling states and for each individual.
The assumption of log earnings being additively separable in education and experience is com-
monly used in the literature (compare, e.g., Mincer (1974)). Assuming a deterministic relationship
for experience is equivalent to using potential labor market experience as a proxy for actual experi-
ence in a Mincer earnings regression. I abstract from work during studying, and thus assume that
individuals enter the labor market {either at age a = 18 or at age a = 22 depending on college at-
tendance decision{ with zero experience. In a similar framework, Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil
(2005) also make the assumption about returns to experience being the same in both schooling
states and for all individuals.
15Assumption 4 Individuals have a common discount factor.
The literature on credit constraints in general faces the problem of how to distinguish hetero-
geneity in borrowing rates from heterogeneity in time preferences. For example, Cameron and
Taber (2004) assume one common discount factor for every individual and normalize the interest
rate of the unconstrained individuals to be equal to this discount factor. If high-return individuals
do not attend college because of a high discount rate, a policy intervention would have to be justi¯ed
by high social returns to college that are correlated with private returns or with time-inconsistent
preferences, e.g. people becoming more patient when getting older.
Assumption 5 Individuals are risk-neutral.
Thus {in a framework with uncertainty{ the college attendance choice problem simpli¯es to maxi-
mizing the expected present value of earnings net of direct costs including monetized psychological
costs or bene¯ts.1213
I model the college attendance decision of the high school graduate at age 18 as follows: An
individual decides to attend college, S = 1, if the expected present value of college earnings minus
the expected present value of high school earnings is larger than the costs (direct costs, i.e. monetary
cost of tuition, books, transportation, board and room if necessary, and monetized psychological
costs or bene¯ts) of attending university:
S¤
i = EPV (Y 1
i ) ¡ EPV (Y 0











(1 + ri)a¡18 ¡ Ci ¸ 0 (3)
In the following I will discuss how I use data on subjective expectations of earnings in this model,
and how conventional approaches would use earnings realizations instead, having to correct for
potential self-selection into college.
Assume that the economic model generating the data for potential outcomes is of the form:
lnY
j
ia = ®j + ¯0
jXi + °(a ¡ sj ¡ 6) + U
j
ia (4)
= ®j + ¯0
jXi + °(a ¡ sj ¡ 6) + µ0
jfi + ²
j
ia for j = 0;1 and a = 18;:::;A;
12As shown in section 4, individuals choose schooling also based on perceived earnings risk. In my future research,
I will incorporate this additional determinant in a structural model, making use of subjective expectations to derive
measures of perceived idiosyncratic risk that do not confound unobserved heterogeneity and risk.
13In order to use a common framework for deriving testable predictions and performing policy experiments applying
the Local Instrumental Variables (LIV) methodology, the participation equation of college attendance has to be in
additively separable form and therefore I need to rely on a relatively simple model of college attendance choice that
consists of maximizing the expected present value of earnings net of costs. Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)
use an even simpler set-up to motivate their selection equation of school choice in their LIV approach, analyzing the
schooling decision without allowing for uncertainty.
16where j = 0 denotes high school degree (12 years of schooling, s0 = 12), and j = 1 college
degree (16 years of schooling, s1 = 16). In terms of observable variables a labels age, A age at
retirement and (a ¡ sj ¡ 6) represents potential labor market experience, while X denotes other
observable time-invariant variables. I assume that log earnings pro¯les are parallel in experience
across schooling levels. Thus the coe±cient on experience is the same in both schooling states,
°1 = °0 = ° (compare Mincer (1974) and Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)).
Uj represents the unobservables in the potential outcome equation, which are composed of a
part that is anticipated at the time of the college attendance decision, µ0





ia) = 0 for j = 0;1.14 Thus in this model self-selection into schooling on
unobservables arises from µ0
jfi, which captures the anticipated part of the idiosyncratic returns (see
equation (6)), while the unanticipated ²
j
ia can obviously not be acted upon. µ0
jfi is unobserved
in the conventional approach using earnings realizations, while µ0
jfi is implicitly `observed' in the
approach using information on subjective expectations of earnings (see below for more details).
Thus the two potential outcomes relevant for the college attendance decision are:
lnY 0
ia = ~ ®0 + ¯0




ia = ~ ®1 + ¯0
1Xi + °a + µ0
1fi + ²1
ia; (5)
with ~ ®j =
¡
®j ¡ °(sj + 6)
¢
for j = 0;1. The individual return to college in this framework can
be written as:
e ½i = lnY 1
ia ¡ lnY 0
ia
= e ® + (¯1 ¡ ¯0)0Xi + (µ1 ¡ µ0)0fi + (²1
ia ¡ ²0
ia);
where e ® = ( ~ ®1 ¡ ~ ®0). The individual return to college can never be observed, as only one of the
two potential outcomes is observable.
From the individual's answers on her expectations of earnings for age 25 (a = 25), one can
derive the following information on expected earnings:
E(lnY 0
ia) = ~ ®0 + ¯0
0Xi + °a + µ0
0fi
E(lnY 1
ia) = ~ ®1 + ¯0
1Xi + °a + µ0
1fi; (6)
14In the `conventional' Generalized Roy model (see, e.g. Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)) there is self-
selection on U0 and U1 (see equation (4)) and no distinction between anticipated and unanticipated idiosyncratic
returns. Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) analyze ex post returns in a framework without uncertainty as is
common in the literature. I analyze school choice under uncertainty and ex ante returns. Therefore I distinguish
between a part of the idiosyncratic returns that is anticipated and (potentially) acted upon at the time of the schooling
decision and a part that is not anticipated and can thus not be acted upon (compare Cunha, Heckman and Navarro
(2005) whose goal is to understand, which part of idiosyncratic returns is anticipated). Subjective expectations
incorporate this information directly, as they only include the part that is anticipated.
17Skill prices, µ0;µ1, can be allowed to di®er across individuals. Also I do not need to assume
rational expectations. Nevertheless, I do need assumptions about the way returns to experience
enter and I can not allow for heterogeneity in returns to experience, because the questions about
earnings expectations have only been asked for one point of the life-cycle, that is for age 25.15 Using
the information given in (6), I can derive an expression for expected gross returns:
½i = E(lnY 1
ia ¡ lnY 0
ia)
= e ® + (¯1 ¡ ¯0)0Xi + (µ1 ¡ µ0)0fi: (7)
To estimate the model of college attendance choice (see equation (3), I make use of the data
on subjective earnings expectation (6) applying the following approximation E(Yia) ´ E(elnYia) » =
eE(lnYia)+0:5V ar(lnYia). Given the assumptions about experience, I can rewrite the participation









Si = 1 if S¤
i ¸ 0 (8)
Si = 0 otherwise;
where Si is a binary variable indicating the treatment status.
In the next two sections, I ¯rst estimate cumulative distribution functions of costs of college at-
tendance for di®erent income categories and second, I derive and test the prediction of heterogeneity
in the interest rates that households face.
6 The Cumulative Distribution Function of Costs of College At-
tendance
The participation equation of college attendance, as derived from the model in the previous section
(see equation 8 and Appendix B), is additively separable in expected gross returns, ½, and a cost
term re°ecting total college attendance costs, K, which depend on direct costs such as tuition costs,
the interest rate that the household faces and psychological costs:16
S = 1 , S¤ = ½ ¡ K ¸ 0
With data on each individual's expected return, ½ and on her decision to attend college or
not, S = 0;1, it is possible to derive the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of overall costs of
15Belzil (2001) suggests that heterogeneity in returns to experience is important in addition to heterogeneity in
returns to schooling. This has rarely been taken into account in the current literature. It would be an interesting
second step to also take into account heterogeneity in returns to experience by asking about expected earnings for
several points of the life-cycle.
16This is an approximation to the participation equation as derived from the model, as it neglects higher order
terms of ½, i.e. ½
2, ½
3 etc (see Appendix B).
18college attendance, FK(k), assuming that overall costs, K, are independent of the expected returns,
½:
Pr(S = 1j½ = ~ ½) = Pr(K · ~ ½j½ = ~ ½) = FKj½=~ ½(~ ½) = FK(~ ½): (9)
Intuitively, the fraction of the people expecting return ~ ½, who decide to attend college, re°ects the
fraction of people with costs smaller than expected return ~ ½.
Being able to estimate the cumulative distribution function of costs can improve our understand-
ing of the causes for the large di®erences in enrollment rates between poor and rich individuals.
Finding that the cumulative distribution function of costs of the poor stochastically dominates the
one of the rich individuals suggests that poor individuals face signi¯cantly higher costs of ¯nancing
due to lack of collateral or potentially higher unobserved psychological costs (or both). Direct costs
of college are likely to be similar for poor and rich individuals, or even smaller for the poor, if there
are tuition waivers.
I estimate Pr(S = 1j½ = ~ ½) over the support of ½ by performing Fan's (1992) locally weighted
linear regression of college attendance, S, on the expected return, which indirectly implies estimat-
ing the cumulative distribution function of overall costs, FK(k), given the independence assumption,
½ ? K.17 The c.d.f. of costs can only be estimated over the support of the expected return (see
equation (9)).18
To compare the cumulative distribution function of costs for di®erent income classes, I perform a
locally weighted linear regression for \low" income individuals (yearly per capita income less than
5,000 pesos), \middle" income (between 5,000 and 10,000 pesos) and \high" income individuals
(more than 10,000 pesos). Note though that even the \high" income individuals are not rich, as
the sample only comprises about the poorest third of the high school graduate population. Figure
7 shows that the c.d.f. of costs for poorer individuals is shifted to the right. For every given level
of costs on the support, e.g. K = 0:6, there is always a larger fraction of poor individuals facing
higher costs (more than 75% of the poor face costs K > 0:6) than rich individuals (only 55% face
costs K > 0:6). To put it di®erently, among individuals with expected returns around ½ = 0:6,
45% of rich individuals attend, but only 25% of the poor, that is poor individuals require higher
expected returns to be induced to attend college.
To analyze whether there is a statistically signi¯cant di®erence in the cumulative distribution
function of costs of the poorer versus the richer individuals, I calculate point-wise con¯dence in-
tervals applying a bootstrap procedure. Figure 8 plots the c.d.f. of poor and rich individuals with
17I use a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 0.3, as the sample sizes for the di®erent income groups (high, middle,
low) are relatively small with 605, 923 and 1171 observations respectively. The choice of the kernel does not a®ect
the results, while a smaller bandwidth will lead to a more wiggly line, while not changing the result that there is a
signi¯cant right shift in the c.d.f. of costs for poorer individuals (see below).
18Note that I drop large outliers of expected returns in the plotted graphs (upper 8%), thus being left with a
support of [0.05, 1.2]. Including them would cause the nonparametric regression line to start sloping down for returns
larger than 1.1, which seems to be driven by some outliers where people state very high returns but do not attend.
1995%-con¯dence intervals and illustrates that the c.d.f. of costs of the poor is signi¯cantly shifted to
the right compared to the one the \rich" for a wide range of the support, K 2 [0:25;1:1]. This is also
true comparing the middle and the rich income group for K > 0:35 (see ¯gure 9). Comparing the
middle and low income group, con¯dence intervals slightly overlap, but plotting and bootstrapping
the distance g(x) = ^ FK;Mid(x)¡ ^ FK;Low(x) point-wise for each x on the support, one can reject the
null of g(x) · 0 for part of the support on 10% or 5% (see ¯gure 10).
Thus, the cumulative distribution function of costs of poorer individuals is signi¯cantly shifted
to the right compared to the one of richer individuals, that is poorer individuals face signi¯cantly
higher costs of college attendance and thus require higher expected returns to be induced to attend
college. To understand the role of the di®erent cost components and whether credit constraints
might play an important role in the low enrollment rate of poor Mexicans, I derive a testable
prediction of heterogeneity in interest rate from the model of college attendance choice (see section
5) in the next section.
7 Excess Responsiveness to Changes in Direct Costs
The college attendance choice model described in section 5 implies that individuals who face a high






¯ ¯ ¯ is increasing in r: (10)
Intuitively, a one-unit increase in costs has to be ¯nanced through a loan with interest rate r (or
foregone savings), and thus has larger negative e®ects on individuals facing high ¯nancing costs.
I test this prediction using dummies for groups, who are likely to face di®erent interest rates if
credit constraints are important, such as di®erent categories of parental income (and wealth). Thus
I test for excess responsiveness of poor individuals with respect to changes in direct costs, such as
tuition costs and distance to college.
The prediction of excess responsiveness of potentially credit constrained groups to changes in
direct costs is not speci¯c to my model, but can be derived from a more general class of school
choice models, for example from the model of Cameron and Taber (2004), which is based on di®erent
assumptions concerning heterogeneity in interest rate (see section 5). Card (1995), Kling (2001)
and Cameron and Taber (2004) use a similar test interacting variables such as parental income and
race with a dummy for the presence of a college in the residential county.19
Compared to conventional approaches having information on subjective expectations has the
following two advantages: First, I can control directly for one important set of determinants of
college attendance, that is expected returns and perceived risk of earnings, and thereby avoid a
19Card and Kling ¯nd evidence of important credit constraints for an older cohort of the National Longitudinal
Survey (NLS Young Men), while Cameron and Taber do not ¯nd evidence of credit constraints for the U.S.A. using
the NLSY 1979.
20potential omitted-variable problem.20 This makes my test more robust and enables me to analyze
the validity of the test used without controlling for these determinants. Second, being poor does
not necessarily imply being credit constrained: only poor individuals with high expected returns
are potentially prevented from attending college due to high ¯nancing costs, while poor low-return
individuals would not decide to attend college anyways. Thus with information on expected returns
I can re¯ne the test and test for excess responsiveness of poor high-expected-return individuals to
changes in direct costs.
In the following, I present results for the full sample using per capita parental income dummies
as proxies. Results for the adolescent sample correcting for potential sample selection and results
using dummies of the indicator for parental income and wealth are very similar (see Appendix C).
The ¯rst measure of costs that I use is the distance of the adolescent's locality of residence to the
closest university (see data section 3.3). As shown in section 4 living further away from the closest
university has signi¯cantly negative e®ects on the probability to attend college. Table 4 illustrates
that the negative e®ect of a larger distance to college is only signi¯cant for the poorest individuals:
living 20 to 40 kilometers away from college instead of a distance of less than 20 kilometers decreases
the probability of attending by about 6 percentage points for the poorest income category (living
more than 40 kilometers away has a negative e®ect on all income categories, but is never signi¯cant).
In this case being able to control for earnings expectations does not change the results, despite the
fact that higher expected return and a higher probability of work with a college degree have large
positive e®ects on attendance.
I use yearly tuition and enrollment fees as the second cost measure, that is a dummy for tuition
costs above 750 pesos, which is equivalent to about 15% of median yearly per capita income and
thus represents a signi¯cant ¯nancial burden for poor individuals. Table 5 shows that higher tuition
costs have a signi¯cantly negative e®ect on the poorest individuals decreasing their likelihood of
attendance by 7.5 percentage points. The e®ect on individuals in the \middle" income category is
still negative, but smaller in magnitude and not signi¯cant, while the e®ect on richer individuals
is in fact positive. This could be driven by the fact that for rich individuals living close to an
expensive \high quality" university increases the likelihood to attend. This is particularly likely
for female adolescents, who {according to family traditions{ should not move to a di®erent city on
their own, unless married or with someone of the family.
The results show that there is excess responsiveness of poor individuals with respect to a change
20Omitting expected returns in the participation equation could cause a problem as in this case the error term
would contain unobserved heterogeneity in ability re°ecting unobserved di®erences in expected returns (see equation
(7) and (8) in the previous section), which might be correlated with the interaction term of parental income and
direct college costs. It has been shown that measures of schooling costs, such as distance to college, are correlated
with observed ability measures such as AFQT score, and are thus most likely also correlated with unobserved ability
(see Carneiro and Heckman (2002)). Similarly the interaction between parental income and direct college costs could
be correlated with unobserved ability, which might hamper the interpretation of results of the test. Making use of
data on expected returns and perceived risks directly can avoid this speci¯c endogeneity concern.
21in direct costs (di®erential e®ect signi¯cant on 1% for tuition costs, not signi¯cant on conventional
levels for distance after controlling for tuition). If this e®ect is a result of credit constraints, it
should be driven by poor individuals with high expected returns. Table 6 shows that in fact poor
high-expected-return individuals are the ones, who are most responsive to changes in direct costs
in comparison to all other groups.
While controlling for measure of expected returns and higher moments does not change the
results signi¯cantly, taking into account that what matters is being poor and having high expected
returns makes a di®erence: for the adolescent sample, tuition appears not to have any signi¯cant
e®ect when purely being interacted with income dummies, while it does in fact have a signi¯cantly
negative e®ect for poor individuals with high expected returns. The above results are consistent
with the predictions of a model with credit constraints, and thus provide suggestive evidence of their
impact on college attendance decisions of poor Mexicans with high expected returns. Nevertheless,
this result could still be {at least partially{ driven by unobserved heterogeneity in preferences.
8 Policy Experiments
The results above indicate that poor individuals face signi¯cantly higher costs and that poor high-
expected-return individuals are most sensitive to changes in direct costs. These ¯ndings are con-
sistent with credit constraints, which would create scope for policy interventions such as student
loan programs. In this section, I evaluate potential welfare implications of the introduction of a
means-tested student loan program, by analyzing the e®ects of a change in the interest rate faced by
poor (or poor and able) individuals. I estimate the change in college attendance rates, and derive
the expected returns for the individuals who change their college attendance decision in response
to the policy (\marginal" expected returns).
As discussed above, the evidence presented is suggestive of credit constraints, but leaves the
possibility of other factors also driving the low college attendance rates among poor. It is worth
noting that even if some but not all of the empirical patterns found is driven by credit constraints,
this would imply scope for policy interventions. Furthermore, government policies such as student
loan programs might still be recommendable, even if the empirical fact mostly re°ects heterogeneity
in time preferences, for example. This could be the case, if there are externalities from college
attendance (correlated with private returns), or if people have time-inconsistent preferences, e.g.
they become more patient when getting older.
I perform policy experiments and derive marginal returns using the college attendance choice
model of section 5 and applying the Local Instrumental Variables methodology of Heckman and
Vytlacil (2005) to a setting with subjective expectations of earnings instead of earnings realizations.
The comparison between \marginal" expected returns of individuals, who switch participation
in response to a policy, and average expected returns of individuals attending college is interesting
not only from a policy-evaluation point of view. If \marginal" expected returns are higher than
22expected returns of individuals, who attend college, then individuals at the margin have to face
particularly high unobserved costs, as otherwise they would also be attending college given their
high expected returns.
This idea follows Card's interpretation (Card (1999, 2001)) of the ¯nding that in many studies
devoted to estimating the \causal" e®ect of schooling, instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the
return to schooling exceed ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates. Since IV can be interpreted as
estimating the return for individuals induced to change their schooling status by the selected instru-
ment, ¯nding higher returns for \switchers" suggests that these individuals face higher marginal
costs of schooling. In other words, Card's interpretation (2001) of this ¯nding is that \marginal
returns to education among the low-education subgroups typically a®ected by supply-side innova-
tions tend to be relatively high, re°ecting their high marginal costs of schooling, rather than low
ability that limits their return to education."
This argument has the following two problems (compare Carneiro and Heckman (2002)): ¯rst,
the validity of the instruments used in this literature is questionable,21 and second, even granting
the validity of the instruments, the IV-OLS evidence is consistent with models of self selection or
comparative advantage in the labor market even in the absence of credit constraints. The problem
is that ordinary least squares does not necessarily estimate the average return of those individuals
attending college, E(¯jS = 1) ´ E(lnY1 ¡ lnY0jS = 1), which would be the correct comparison
group to test for credit constraints. Rather OLS identi¯es E(lnY1jS = 1) ¡ E(lnY0jS = 0), which
could be larger or smaller than E(¯jS = 1).22
Subjective expectations of earnings enable me to directly get at the expected returns of indi-
viduals attending college, while I estimate the missing part of this test {the \marginal" expected
return of those individuals who respond to a change, for example, in distance to college{, using the
Local Instrumental Variable (LIV) approach of Heckman and Vytlacil (2005). In contrast to the
conventional approach, I do not face the problem of missing counterfactual earnings, but have data
on expected earnings for both schooling scenarios and can thus compute expected gross returns for
each individual. Therefore, I do not have to rely on the unveri¯able assumption that direct costs to
college, such as distance to college, satisfy the exclusion restriction, but I can test this assumption.
Figures 13 and 14 (see Appendix C) show a scatter plot of expected returns and distance to
college and a locally weighted linear regression line of expected returns on distance to college,
from which no pattern is apparent. In table 17 (see Appendix C) I regress expected returns on
observable characteristics of the individual and her family background, such as GPA of junior high
21Carneiro and Heckman (2002) show for several commonly used instruments using the NLSY that they are either
correlated with observed ability measures, such as AFQT, or uncorrelated with schooling.
22E(lnY1jS = 1)¡E(lnY0jS = 0) = E(¯jS = 1)+(E(lnY0jS = 1) ¡ E(lnY0jS = 0)), where the last bracket could
be larger or smaller than zero. In particular, in the case of comparative advantage, the OLS estimate will be smaller
than the average return of those attending. This could lead to a case in which IV estimates are larger than OLS
estimates, but smaller than the average return of those attending, from which one would wrongly conclude that credit
constraints are important.
23school, father's education (same result using mother's education), per capita parental income, and
on polynomials of distance to college. For the full sample I ¯nd that expected returns and distance
to college are signi¯cantly positively correlated, though the coe±cient on distance is small. For the
adolescent sample {controlling for sample selection by applying a Heckman two-step procedure{ the
coe±cients on the polynomials of distance to college are not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. Note
that the table presents results for distance and squared distance, but adding further polynomials
does not change this result, while for the full sample all polynomials become insigni¯cant once higher
than second-order polynomials are included. The result for the adolescent sample is comforting, as
this implies that at least a necessary condition for the validity of the exclusion restriction is satis¯ed.
Nevertheless, one would like to allow distance to college to enter in this regression in a completely
°exible form, h(C). This is in principle possible by estimating a partially linear regression model,
but is complicated by a potential sample selection problem for the adolescent sample. Results of
this procedure will be included in the next version of the paper. Thus the exclusion restriction is
violated for the full sample, but I can not reject the hypothesis that it holds for the adolescent
sample. Therefore, I perform the following analysis using the adolescent sample. One should keep
in mind that previous results were similar using both approaches, that is using the full sample and
using the adolescent sample correcting for sample selection, and that results suggested that sample
selection on unobservables did not seem to be an issue.
8.1 Implications of Credit Constraints for Marginal Returns to College
From the latent index model (8), I can derive the return at which an individual is exactly indi®erent
between attending college or not, so that S¤ = 0:












The presence of credit constraints has the following implication for marginal returns: implicit









and thus credit constrained individuals, who face higher borrowing costs, rCC > rNC, have higher
marginal returns (ceteris paribus) than those individuals on the margin who are not credit con-
strained:
½M(rCC) > ½M(rNC):
In the next subsections I illustrate how the marginal return to college can be derived, and how
it can be used to perform policy experiments.
248.2 Derivation of the Marginal Return to College
This section follows Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)
in their derivation of the \Marginal Treatment E®ect" (MTE). Nevertheless, their goal is to get
estimates of summary measures of the return-to-schooling distribution purged from selection bias
and the MTE is just a tool in this encounter. In contrast to the conventional approach, I do
not have to deal with self-selection problems because with subjective expectations of earnings, I
\observe" each individual in both schooling states, while I am interested in the marginal return to
college for its own sake.
One important ¯rst step in the derivation and estimation of the marginal return to college is
the estimation of the propensity score P(Z) ´ P(S = 1jZ = z), which represents the probability
of attending college conditional on observables Z, making use of the participation equation as
derived from the school choice model in section 5. Note that I perform the following monotonic
transformation of the participation equation, S¤ = º(Z) ¡ V :
S¤ ¸ 0 , º(Z) ¸ V , FV (º(Z)) ¸ FV (V );
and de¯ne ¹(Z) ´ FV (º(Z)) and US ´ FV (V ). In this case US = FV (V ) is distributed
uniformly, US » Unif[0;1].23 Therefore, the participation equation can be written as follows:
S¤ ¸ 0 , P(Z) = ¹(Z) ¸ US:
An individual indi®erent between attending college or not is characterized by US = ¹(Z) =
P(Z). It is thus possible to estimate US for the indi®erent individual by estimating the propensity
score P(Z), i.e. the probability of attending college.
This will allow me to derive the marginal return to college or Marginal Treatment E®ect (MTE),
which in this framework will be de¯ned as:
¢MTE(uS) = E(lnY1 ¡ lnY0jUS = uS) = E(½jUS = uS) (12)
and it represents the average gross gain to college for individuals who are indi®erent between
attending university or not at the level of unobservables US = uS.
One important drawback of the LIV methodology is that the analysis relies critically on the
assumption that the selection equation has a representation in additively separable form, S¤ =
¹(Z) + US (see, e.g., Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006)).
Using information on subjective expectations of earnings, I can write the participation equation (8)
as derived from the school choice model as the following fourth-order polynomial in the unobservable
interest rate, 1 + r (see Appendix B for the derivation):
S¤
i ¸ 0 , (1 + ri)4 ¡ A(Zi;µ)(1 + ri)3 ¡ B(Zi;µ) · 0; (13)
23US is distributed uniformly, as Pr(US · ¹(Z)) = Pr(V · F
¡1
V (¹(Z))) = FV (F
¡1
V (¹(Z))) = ¹(Z). Thus the
propensity score is equal to P(Z) ´ Pr(S = 1jZ = z) = Pr(S
¤ ¸ 0jZ) = Pr(US · ¹(Z)) = ¹(Z).






including the expected return ½i from the data on subjective expectations and a coe±cient vector,
µ. One can show that this fourth-order polynomial equation has exactly one positive root with
1 + ri ¸ 0, which can be analytically computed, so that the following holds:
g (Zi;µ) ¸ 1 + ri ) (1 + ri)4 ¡ A(Zi;µ)(1 + ri)3 ¡ B(Zi;µ) · 0:
De¯ning Vi as deviations from the mean interest rate, ri = ¹ r+Vi, the selection equation can be
rewritten in the following additively separable form:
S¤
i = ¡(1 + ¹ r) + g (Zi;µ) ¡ Vi
Si = 1 if S¤
i ¸ 0 (14)
Si = 0 otherwise.
I assume Vi » N(0;1) and estimate the propensity score P(Z) using a Maximum Likelihood
procedure.
With the help of the predicted values of the propensity score, [ P(z), I can de¯ne the values
uS = FV (V ) over which the marginal return to college (MTE) can be identi¯ed:24 the MTE is
de¯ned for values of [ P(z), for which one obtains positive frequencies for both subsamples S = 0
and S = 1. The observations for which [ P(z) is outside of the support are dropped.25











































it ¡ lnY 0
itjP(Z) = p;S = 1
¢
:
With subjective expectations of earnings one has data on each individual's expectation of earn-
ings in both schooling states, and thus also for those individuals who decide to attend college,
24Identi¯cation of the MTE depends critically on the support of the propensity score (see Heckman and Vytlacil
(2001)). As conventional treatment parameters such as ATE and TTE are weighted averages of the MTE (see, e.g.,
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)), also the derivation of those parameters depends on the support. Support problems can
lead to substantial biases. With subjective expectations I have direct information on the TTE, while the derivation
of the policy relevant treatment e®ect is not a®ected by support problems, as {in this derivation{ the MTE only has
positive weight over its' support.
25Even after trimming, the sparseness of data in the tails results in a large amount of variability in the estimation




it ¡ lnY 0
itjS = 1
¢
. I estimate P(Z) in a ¯rst step and therefore have a value [ P(z) = p for
each individual.
Finally I ¯t a nonparametric regression of
m(p) = pE[lnY 1
it ¡ lnY 0
itjP(Z) = p;S = 1]
on the propensity score using a locally weighted regression approach (Fan (1992)). The main
strength of this approach is that it assumes no functional form and delivers a natural estimator
of the slope of the regression function m(p) at p which is equivalent to the MTE for the di®erent
points on the grid, p = uS.
The implementation of the approach is as follows: I divide the range of my independent variable
p into a grid of points and estimate a series of locally weighted regressions for each point on the
grid, where the weights are larger the closer the observations are to the speci¯c point on the grid.
The choice of kernel and bandwidth de¯ne \close".26 The predicted value of this regression at p is
then the estimated value of the regression function at the grid point, i.e., ^ m(p) = ^ ¯0(p) + ^ ¯1(p)p.
^ ¯1(p) is a natural estimator of the slope of the regression function at p and thus estimates the MTE
for di®erent values of p = uS, as @m(p)=@p = ¢MTE(uS). I calculate standard errors by applying
a bootstrap over the whole procedure described in this section.
To perform policy experiments, I introduce the following notation: the \Policy Relevant Treat-
ment E®ect" (PRTE) is a weighted average of the marginal returns to college (¢MTE(uS)), where
the weights depend on who changes participation in response to the policy of interest (compare
Heckman and Vytlacil (2001)). One important assumption underlying this analysis is that the par-











P is the baseline probability of S = 1 with cumulative distribution function FP, while P¤ is de¯ned
as the probability produced under an alternative policy regime with cumulative distribution function
FP¤. The intuition is as follows: given a certain level of unobservables, u, those individuals with
P(Z) > u will attend college, which is equivalent to a fraction 1¡FP(u). A reduction, for example,
in direct costs, Z, will lead to a new larger P(Z¤). Thus for a given u, there are now more
people deciding to attend college, 1¡FP¤(u), and the change can be expressed as FP(u)¡FP¤(u).
The weight is normalized by the change in the proportion of people induced into the program,
E(P¤) ¡ E(P), to express the impact of the policy on a per-person basis.
26The choice of the kernel is not a critical one (see, e.g., Deaton (1997)) and my results are robust with respect to
this choice. On the other hand, the choice of the bandwidth is much more crucial as it controls the trade-o® between
bias and variance. I present results for several di®erent bandwidths.
27The following is a special case of a PRTE: Consider a policy that shifts Zk (the kth element of
Z) to Zk + ". For example, Zk might be the tuition faced by an individual and the policy change
might be to provide an incremental tuition subsidy of " dollars. Suppose that S¤ = Z0° + V , and
that °k (the kth element of °) is nonzero. The resulting PRTE is:
PRTE" = E(½ijZ0° · V · Z0° + "°k); (18)
i.e., PRTE" is the average return among individuals who are induced into university by the
incremental subsidy.
I will use the PRTE to evaluate di®erent policies by deriving the average marginal expected
return of individuals induced to change their schooling status as a response to these policies, and
compare the results to the average return of those attending.
8.3 Estimation of the Marginal Return to College
This section describes how the estimation of the marginal return to college is implemented, and
discusses the empirical results of this estimation, while the next section discusses the results of
the policy experiments. I estimate the propensity score, i.e. the probability of attending college,
from selection equation (14) {as derived from the simple college attendance choice model (see
section 5){ using a Maximum Likelihood procedure. In order to empirically implement the notion
of costs, C, from my theoretical model, I use the following auxiliary regression containing distance
to the closest university, \Univ Dist", distance squared, \Univ Dist Sq", and state ¯xed e®ects
to capture di®erences in direct costs, and mother's education and GPA of junior high school to
capture preferences for education of the individual and her family and thus monetized psychological
costs/bene¯ts of attending college:27
C = ±0 + ±1Univ Dist + ±2Univ Dist Sq + ±3GPA + ±4Mother's schooling + ±5State dummies:
The results of the Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the propensity score are displayed in table
7. The variables capturing costs of attending college, i.e. distance to the closest university, distance
squared, GPA of junior high school and mother's schooling attainment are all highly signi¯cant and
with the expected sign, as are expected returns to college and a term capturing the di®erence in
variances of college and high school earnings.
In order to give an idea of the magnitude of the e®ects, I present tables 8 and 9. In table
8 I illustrate the e®ect of a change in the distance to the closest university, of having a mother
with one more year of schooling and of having a one percentage point higher GPA. The baseline
case evaluates all explanatory variables at their medians, that is living about 18km away from the
27I use mother's schooling as the father is not present in some of the households and would thus lead to more
missing values. The results are robust with respect to using father's schooling instead. In contrast to previous
speci¯cations, I add mother's years of schooling and km-distance directly instead of using dummies, as it is hard to
achieve convergence otherwise.
28closest university, having a mother who has ¯ve years of completed schooling and having a GPA of
82%, which leads to a predicted probability of attending college of 22%. Living 5km closer to the
closest university increases the probability of attending by 1:3 percentage points that is by about
6%.28 Having a mother with one year more of schooling increases the probability of attending by
1:8 percentage points, while having a one percentage point higher GPA increases the probability of
attending by 0:7 percentage points. Table 9 displays the e®ect of an increase in expected returns to
college for di®erent baseline cases. The e®ect of a 10 percentage point (or 16%) increase in expected
returns increases the probability of attending college by about 1 percentage point (or 5%). Note
that the e®ect of an increase in return doubles if the individual faces lower direct costs (lives
5km closer to the closest university), which is consistent with the presence of credit constraints as
individuals, who face lower costs are less likely to be credit constrained, and can thus act upon
higher expected returns more easily.
Figure 4 depicts the density of the predicted probability of attending college for high school
graduates, who decided to attend college, and those, who stopped school after high school, using
smoothed sample histograms. It illustrates that the probability of attending college of the \Jovenes"
sample is generally relatively low, but that there is a right-shift in the density for high school
graduates, who decided to attend college, with a mean (median) probability of about 36% (34%),
while the mean (median) probability of attending for those who stopped is around 29% (27%).
Figure 4 illustrates that there is little mass outside of the interval 0:1 and 0:8, so that the support
over which I estimate the marginal return to college is for p in the interval [0:1;0:8].
As the last step I perform Fan's locally weighted regression to estimate the marginal return to
college by estimating a series of locally weighted regressions on each point on the grid of uS = P(Z)
using a step size of 0:01 over the support of P(Z). The estimators of the slope of these regressions
for the di®erent points on the grid are the marginal returns for di®erent levels of unobservables
us = P(Z) (as illustrated in the previous section). Figure 5 displays the marginal return to college
for three di®erent bandwidths using a Gaussian kernel. It illustrates that the choice of bandwidth
controls the trade-o® between bias and variance: while a relatively small bandwidth of 0:05 leads to a
wiggly line that is clearly undersmoothed, a large bandwidth of 0:2 seems to lead to an oversmoothed
graph (see discussion in section 8.2). Note that the marginal return to college is upward sloping
independent of the choice of the bandwidth: Individuals facing higher (unobservable) borrowing
rates, who have to be compensated by a higher P(Z) to be made indi®erent, have higher expected
returns on the margin.
I calculate standard errors by performing a bootstrap over the two steps described in the
previous section. Figure 6 displays the marginal return to college with 95% con¯dence intervals
using a bandwidth of 0:15. Unfortunately error bands are wide in particularly for large values of
28Those individuals who already live less than 5km away from the closest university are given a value of 0km
distance.
29P(Z) for which there are few data points.29
In the next section I will use these estimation results to perform policy experiments.
8.4 Results of the Policy Experiments
The goal of this section is twofold: First, I evaluate potential welfare implications of government
policies, such as the introduction of a means-tested student loan program. Therefore I analyze the
e®ect of a change in interest rate for poor (or poor and able) individuals and the e®ect of a change
in direct costs {using distance to college{, by computing the change in college attendance rates as
a result of the policy and by deriving the average \marginal" expected return of the individuals,
who change their attendance decision in response. For the evaluation of policies it is crucial to
derive the \marginal" return instead of just looking at the \average" return of a randomly selected
individual, as the individuals, who will respond to policies are those \at the margin", while the
\average" individual might be attending college anyways or might not be induced to attend and is
thus not relevant for understanding the e®ect of the policy.
Second, I test whether the average \marginal" expected return is signi¯cantly larger than the
average expected return of individuals attending college. This is comparable to Card's analysis of
comparing IV coe±cients to OLS coe±cients (or better to the \Treatment on the Treated E®ect"),
but with subjective expectations of earnings instead of earnings realizations. Larger \marginal"
returns indicate that individuals at the margin face higher unobserved costs (compare analysis in
section 6).
In terms of the policy evaluation I estimate the \Policy Relevant Treatment E®ect" (PRTE) for
the policies of interest, which will be a weighted average of the marginal returns to college (MTE),
where the weights depend on who will change participation as a response to the policy (see section
8.2).
The ¯rst policy I evaluate is the e®ect of decreasing the distance to the closest university,
for example by building new universities in places that previously did not have higher education
institutions. In section 7 I have shown that a change in distance to college a®ected poor high-
return individuals most. Nevertheless, a change in costs only a®ects individuals at the margin,
which I will take into account in this section. I perform the analysis by decreasing the distance to
college by 10 kilometers (for di®erent target groups), and determine the resulting distribution of
the new propensity score, P¤. I then use the baseline distribution of P and the new distribution
after the policy change of P¤ to determine the relevant weights (see equation (17)) and determine
a weighted average of MTE(u), which gives me the PRTE for this speci¯c policy (see equation
(16) and (17)).30
29Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) have the same problem of very wide con¯dence bands using the NLSY.
The fact that my sample only contains relatively poor individuals all of which have a low probability of attending
college is likely to aggravate the problem.
30I use the MTE that is based on a bandwidth of 0.15 and thus a rather conservative choice, as for smaller
30A 10 kilometer-reduction in the distance to the closest university leads to an increase in college
attendance of about 10% (2.3 percentage points), and to an average marginal expected return
of 1.10 for those individuals induced to change their college attendance decision (see table 10).
Decreasing the distance only for very poor individuals (less than 5,000 pesos per capita income),
leads to a change in attendance of 3%, while those individuals who change college attendance have
an average marginal expected return of 1.08. For poor and able individuals (per capita income
less than 5,000 pesos and a GPA higher than the median), this policy would lead to a change
in attendance of 2%, and an average marginal expected return of 1.11. These results imply that
individuals at the margin have to be facing high unobserved costs to explain the fact that they did
not attend college despite very high expected returns. For a full cost-and-bene¯t analysis of this
policy the costs of building new universities would obviously have to be taken into account and it
seems unlikely that this would be an e±cient policy.
A more e±cient policy could consist of the introduction of a governmental student loan program.
Therefore, as a second policy experiment, I consider the e®ect of a decrease in the interest rate
of poor (and able) individuals. A 10% change in the interest rate for very poor individuals leads
to an average marginal return of 1.11 (the college attendance rate increases by about 50%, that is
about 11 percentage points), while this change for poor and able individuals leads to an average
marginal return of 1.14 (see table 10). In both cases, the average marginal return of individuals
induced to change their college attendance decision is signi¯cantly higher than the average return
of those individuals already attending college (0.72).
Again, for a full cost-and-bene¯t analysis one would have to take into account the costs of
providing student loans, that is bureaucratic costs for setting in place an e±cient system for giving
out and recovering loans in addition to costs of interest.31 If a large-scale policy is put in place,
one would additionally have to take into account general equilibrium e®ects, in particular in terms
of skill prices, but also in terms of the e®ects on development and growth of the country, as a more
highly educated workforce might stimulate skill-biased technological change, which could even o®set
the wage depressing e®ects of a larger supply of college graduates. It could be interesting to analyze,
whether individuals take into account the impact of a large-scale student loan or fellowship program
on longer-run skill prices, that is to examine whether and how such a policy a®ects expectations of
future earnings.
9 Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to improve our understanding of both the causes and the implica-
tions of the steep income gradient in college attendance in Mexico by analyzing the determinants
bandwidths there is a stronger increase in the MTE in unobservables.
31Note that if poor credit-constrained individuals are extremely risk averse in terms of taking a loan, a government
loan program might have no or very little e®ect, while a fellowship program could have much larger e®ects.
31of college attendance using data on individuals' subjective expectations of earnings. In particular,
I examined whether expected returns and perceived earnings risk {measures derived from data
on each individual's future earnings distribution{ are important determinants of higher-education
decisions, and whether they help in explaining the strong correlation between parental income and
children's college attendance.
Having data on individuals' expectations of earnings and perceived earnings risks is important,
as not controlling for these measures could lead to a spurious positive correlation between parental
income and college attendance. Since what matters for people's decisions is the perception of their
own cognitive and social skills and how these skills a®ect their future earnings, these data ideally
provide people's expectations conditional on their information sets at the time of the decision.
One of the paper's main ¯ndings is that expected returns to college and perceived risk of future
earnings are important determinants of college attendance decisions, but that lower returns or
higher risk are not su±cient to explain the poor's low college attendance rates. I also ¯nd that poor
individuals require signi¯cantly higher expected returns to be induced to attend college, implying
that they face signi¯cantly higher costs than individuals with wealthy parents. Furthermore, poor
individuals with high expected returns are particularly responsive to changes in direct costs such
as tuition, which is consistent with credit constraints playing an important role.
The results of my policy experiments indicate that there is a notable fraction of poor individuals
with high expected returns, who are close to the margin of attending college, but do not attend.
This suggests that credit constraints could be one of the driving forces of Mexico's large inequalities
in access to higher education and low overall enrollment rates, which is consistent with Mexico's low
government funding for student loans and fellowships for higher education. In this case the results
of my policy experiments suggest that the introduction of a means-tested student loan program
could lead to large welfare gains by removing obstacles to human capital accumulation and fostering
Mexico's development and growth.
It is important to note that the evidence above is consistent with other factors also driving the
poor's low college attendance rates, which would still imply scope for policy interventions, as long
as some of the empirical patterns found were driven by credit constraints. Furthermore, government
policies such as student loan programs might still be recommendable if the steep income gradient
mostly re°ects heterogeneity in time preferences, for example. This could be the case if there are
externalities from college attendance and social returns are correlated with private returns, or if
people have time-inconsistent preferences, e.g. they become more patient when getting older.
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3510 Appendix A
Figure 1: College enrollment rates of 18 to 24 year old high school completers by parental income
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Source: Author’s calculation using the Mexican Family Life Survey, 2003.
College Attendance Rates by Parental Income Quartile (MxFLS)
Figure 2: College enrollment rates of 18 to 24 year old high school completers by parental income
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Source: Author’s calculation using the Jovenes con Oportunidades Survey, 2005.
College Attendance Rates by Parental Income Quartile (Jov)





Figure 4: Predicted probability of attending college for high school graduates, who decided to









0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
P
HS grads who stop HS grads who cont
Predicted Probability of Univ Attendance
37Figure 5: The Marginal Return to College (\MTE") conditional on di®erent levels of unobserved
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Figure 6: The Marginal Return to College (\MTE") conditional on di®erent levels of unobserved












0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
U=P(Z)

















Marginal Return to College






























.2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2
College Attendance Costs
High Income Middle Income Low Income
Cumulative distribution function of Costs by Income Class































.2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2
College Attendance Costs
High Income: Cdf of Costs with 95% CI
Low Income: Cdf of Costs with 95% CI
Cumulative distribution function of Costs by Income Class































.2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2
College Attendance Costs
High Income: Cdf of Costs with 95% CI
Middle Income: Cdf of Costs with 95% CI
Low Income: Cdf of Costs with 95% CI
Cumulative distribution function of Costs by Income Class
Figure 10: Pointwise Di®erence of the Cumulative Distribution Functions of Costs of Middle Income
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41Table 2: Summary statistics of important variables of the two groups of respondents.
Variable Mother Respondent (M) Adolescent Respondent (A) Di®erence ((A)-(M))
Mean/(S.E.) Mean/(S.E.) Mean Di®erence (Sign.)
Attend College 35.8% 23.1% -12.7%***
(0.48) (0.42)
Female 50% 58% 8%***
(0.50) (0.49)
Ability (GPA) 82.3 82.2 -0.1
(10.34) (7.16)
Father's years of schooling 5.3 5.4 0.1
(3.00) (2.99)
Per capita parental income 7493.25 7472.02 -21.23
(7635.84) (7909.00)
Per capita household expenditures 8658.16 8283.25 -374.90*
(5414.89) (5539.60)
Expected gross return 0.65 0.66 0.01
(E(lnYCol) ¡ E(lnYHS)) (0.36) (0.38)
Distance to the closest university 27.40 24.16 -3.24***
(23.35) (22.72)
Number of observations 2010 1670
42Table 3: Probit model for the college attendance decision.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable: Attend College Marg. E®. Marg. E®. Marg. E®.
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
Expected Return to College 0.064*** 0.059*** 0.065***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Prob of Work - HS -0.020 -0.030 -0.047
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054)
Prob of Work - College 0.110* 0.098 0.113*
(0.062) (0.063) (0.063)
Var of Log Earn - HS 0.039 -0.430 -0.517
(1.192) (1.214) (1.214)
Var of Log Earn - College -2.975* -2.669* -2.434
(1.557) (1.556) (1.560)
GPA - second tercile (d) 0.041** 0.037*
(0.020) (0.020)
GPA - top tercile (d) 0.144*** 0.143***
(0.019) (0.019)
Father's educ - junior HS (d) 0.084*** 0.063**
(0.026) (0.026)
Father's educ - HS (d) 0.174*** 0.147***
(0.052) (0.052)
Father's educ - Univ (d) 0.472*** 0.442***
(0.085) (0.090)
Per cap Income - 5 to 10k (d) 0.031*
(0.019)
Per cap Income - more than 10k (d) 0.141***
(0.023)
Closest university 20 to 40km (d) -0.039**
(0.018)
Closest university more than 40km (d) -0.037*
(0.021)
Tuition of closest university more than 750 pesos (d) -0.071***
(0.024)
State, Gender, Marital status dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3680 3680 3680
Log likelihood -2216.924 -2162.110 -2135.614
P-value: Test of joint signi¯cance 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
Excl. categories: male, single, lowest GPA tercile, father's education primary or less,
per capita parental income less than 5000 pesos, distance to closest university less
than 20 kilometers, tuition costs less than 750 pesos.
43Table 4: Probit model for the college attendance decision: Di®erential e®ect of distance to university
for di®erent per capita parental income categories.
Model 4 Model 5
Dependent Variable: Attend College Marg. E®. Marg. E®.
(S.E.) (S.E.)
Univ 20 - 40km * Pcap Income < 5k (d) -0.058** -0.060**
(0.028) (0.028)
Univ 20 - 40km * Pcap Income 5 - 10k (d) 0.006 0.008
(0.038) (0.038)
Univ 20 - 40km * Pcap Income > 10k (d) -0.039 -0.045
(0.042) (0.041)
Univ > 40km * Pcap Income < 5k (d) -0.013 -0.018
(0.030) (0.029)
Univ > 40km * Pcap Income 5 - 10k (d) -0.045 -0.055
(0.039) (0.038)
Univ > 40km * Pcap Income > 10k (d) -0.052 -0.054
(0.047) (0.046)
Expected Return to College 0.070***
(0.024)
Exp Log Earn - HS 0.006
(0.020)
Prob of Work - HS -0.043
(0.054)
Prob of Work - College 0.105*
(0.064)
Var of Log Earn - HS -0.355
(1.224)
Var of Log Earn - College -2.488
(1.573)
Per cap Income - 5 to 10k (d) 0.032 0.035
(0.024) (0.024)
Per cap Income - more than 10k (d) 0.156*** 0.158***
(0.029) (0.029)
Controls for Ability and Father's educ Yes Yes
State, Gender, Marital status dummies Yes Yes
Observations 3680 3680
Log likelihood -2156.287 -2146.800
P-value: Test of joint signi¯cance 0.000 0.000
Notes: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. (d) for discrete change of dummy
variable from 0 to 1. Excl. categories: male, single, lowest GPA tercile,
father's education primary or less, per capita parental income less than
5000 pesos, distance to closest university less than 20 kilometers.
44Table 5: Probit model for college attendance decision: Di®erential e®ect of tuition costs for di®erent
per capita parental income categories.
Model 6 Model 7
Dependent Variable: Attend College Marg. E®. Marg. E®.
(S.E.) (S.E.)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income < 5k (d) -0.069*** -0.075***
(0.026) (0.025)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income 5 - 10k (d) -0.040 -0.044
(0.034) (0.034)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income > top (d) 0.081* 0.077*
(0.046) (0.046)
Univ 20 - 40km * Pcap Income < 5k (d) -0.044 -0.044
(0.029) (0.029)
Univ 20 - 40km * Pcap Income 5 - 10k (d) 0.002 0.003
(0.038) (0.038)
Univ 20 - 40km * Pcap Income > 10k (d) -0.034 -0.041
(0.042) (0.042)
Univ > 40km * Pcap Income < 5k (d) -0.008 -0.013
(0.030) (0.030)
Univ > 40km * Pcap Income 5 - 10k (d) -0.048 -0.059
(0.038) (0.038)
Univ > 40km * Pcap Income > 10k (d) -0.046 -0.049
(0.047) (0.047)
Expected Return to College 0.073***
(0.024)
Var of Log Earn - College -2.653*
(1.572)
Per cap Income - 5 to 10k (d) 0.037 0.041
(0.028) (0.029)
Per cap Income - more than 10k (d) 0.117*** 0.119***
(0.033) (0.033)
Controls for Prob of Work, Exp and Var of Log Earn - HS Yes Yes
Controls for Ability and Father's educ Yes Yes
State, Gender, Marital status dummies Yes Yes
Observations 3680 3680
Log likelihood -2149.967 -2139.878
P-value: Test of joint signi¯cance 0.000 0.000
Notes: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. (d) for discrete change of dummy from 0 to 1.
Excl. categories: male, single, lowest GPA tercile, father's education primary or less,
per capita parental income less than 5000 pesos, distance to closest university less
than 20 kilometers, tuition costs less than 750 pesos.
45Table 6: Probit model for the college attendance decision: Excess responsiveness of poor high-
expected-return individuals to tuition costs.
Model 8 Model 9
Dependent Variable: Attend College Marg. E®. Marg. E®.
(S.E.) (S.E.)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income < 5k (d) -0.076*** -0.030
(0.025) (0.037)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income < 5k * Exp. Return high (d) -0.089**
(0.040)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income 5 - 10k (d) -0.041 -0.044
(0.033) (0.043)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income 5 - 10k * Exp. Return high (d) -0.003
(0.054)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income > 10k (d) 0.082* 0.057
(0.046) (0.066)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income > 10k * Exp. Return high (d) 0.031
(0.074)
Expected Return to College 0.084***
(0.025)
Var of Log Earn - College -2.690*
(1.569)
Per cap Income - 5 to 10k (d) 0.033 0.034
(0.023) (0.023)
Per cap Income - more than 10k (d) 0.104*** 0.104***
(0.027) (0.028)
Controls for Prob of Work, Exp and Var of Log Earn - HS Yes Yes
Controls for Ability and Father's educ Yes Yes
State, Gender, Marital status dummies Yes Yes
Observations 3680 3680
Log likelihood -2152.201 -2140.357
P-value 0.000 0.000
Notes: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. (d) for discrete change of dummy from 0 to 1.
Excl. categories: male, single, lowest GPA tercile, father's education primary or less,
per capita parental income less than 5000 pesos, distance to closest university less
than 20 kilometers, tuition costs less than 750 pesos.
46Table 7: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the participation equation as derived from the model
of college attendance choice
Participation Equation
Dependent Variable: Attend College Coe±cients Std. Err.
Costs
University Distance -.0096 .003470***
University Distance Squared .0001 .000036**
GPA of Junior High School .0181 .004249***
Mother's Schooling .0479 .014087***
Bene¯ts
Exp Gross Return to College .2518 .108369**
Di®erence in Variances of College and HS Earnings 2.4630 1.299824*
(Exp Gross Return + Var Di®erence) Squared -.1146 .060826*
Constant
¡(1 + r) -10.2934 .487367***
Log-Likelihood -550.8655
Wald Chi Square (8) 26.98***
N of observations 1057
Signif. levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
47Table 8: E®ect of changes in variables compared to the baseline case.
Dist to Univ Mother's GPA of Exp Gross Return Prob of Di®
schooling Junior HS to College Attending
18.24 5 82 0.6213 0.2213
1 0.013
13.24 5 82 0.61 0.2341
18.24 5 82 0.6213 0.2213
2 0.018
18.24 6 82 0.6213 0.2397
18.24 5 82 0.6213 0.2213
3 0.007
18.24 5 83 0.6213 0.2280
For the baseline case all variables are evaluated at their median. One variable at a time is changed.
48Table 9: E®ect of changes in expected gross returns to college at di®erent baseline cases.
Dist to Univ Mother's GPA of Exp Gross Return Prob of Di®
schooling Junior HS to College Attending
18.24 5 82 0.6213 0.2213
4 0.010
18.24 5 82 0.7213 0.2318
13.24 5 82 0.6213 0.2213
5 0.024
13.24 5 82 0.7213 0.2449
18.24 6 82 0.6213 0.2396
6 0.011
18.24 6 82 0.7213 0.2506
For the ¯rst baseline case all variables are evaluated at their median. Then the e®ect of a change in































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11.1 Derivation of the Participation Equation from the Model of College At-
tendance Choice
In order to use the potential outcome equations (5) and the subjective expectation information (6),
and rewrite the participation equation in terms of expected returns to college, I use the following
approximation
E(Yia) ´ E(elnYia) » = eE(lnYia)+0:5V ar(lnYia) (19)
and assume that V ar(lnY S
ia) = (¾S
i )2 for all a and S = 0;1. Thus I can rewrite the expected
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where I assume that exp(°) < 1+r to apply the rule for a geometric series. Analogously, I can
derive the following expression for EPV (Y 0
i )
EPV (Y 0
i ) = exp
¡







1 + r ¡ exp(°)
¶
: (21)
Using expression (20) and (21), I can write the decision rule in the following way:
An individual decides to attend college if EPV (Y 1
i ) ¡ EPV (Y 0
i ) ¸ C, and thus if
exp
¡
























1 + r ¡ exp(°)
¶
¸ C;
which I can rewrite in the following way
exp
¡
~ ®1 + ¯0





exp( ~ ®0 + ¯0





exp(¡°4) ¢ (1 + r)4 ¸ C exp(°3)(1 + r)3(1 + r ¡ exp(°)):












¢ exp(¡°4) ¢ (1 + r)4
¸ C exp(°3)(1 + r)3(1 + r ¡ exp(°)): (22)
In order to express the decision rule (22) in terms of expected gross returns to university and
use the information on expected returns from `subjective' expectations of earnings (see expression





rewrite the decision rule, which has the form exp(B)¡exp(A)¢L ¸ K. Noting that in this context
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¢ exp(¡°4) ¢ (1 + r)4 ¸ C exp(°3)(1 + r)3(1 + r ¡ exp(°))













A ¡ exp(¡°4) ¢ (1 + r)4 ¡





i )2¢ ¸ 0:
Thus using the `subjective' expectation information, the latent variable model for attending



































S = 1 if S¤ ¸ 0
S = 0 otherwise;
where S is a binary variable indicating the treatment status.
5211.2 Testable Predictions about Excess Responsiveness to Changes in Direct
Costs
Making use of the participation equation for college attendance (23), the following results show




¡(1 + r)4 (exp(°))
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i )2¢ < 0 (24)




¯ ¯ is increasing in r, that is individuals who face a higher interest rate are more
responsive to changes in direct costs.
11.3 Derivation of the Marginal Return to College
Proof for deriving equation (15):
E(U1 ¡ U0jUS · p) =
Z 1
¡1






















E (U1 ¡ U0jUS = uS)duS:
5312 Appendix C: Robustness Checks
Figure 11: Comparison of the cross-sections of expected high school earnings of individuals in grade
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Figure 12: Comparison of the cross-sections of expected college earnings of individuals in grade 12
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55Table 11: Probit model for the college attendance decision correcting for sample selection: First
stage results
Dep Var: Adolescent Respondent Model 1 Model 2
Marg. E®./(S.E.) Marg. E®./(S.E.)
Interview Sunday (d) 0.117** 0.095
(0.058) (0.059)
Interview Thursday (d) -0.070** -0.078**
(0.035) (0.036)
Interview Saturday*Evening (d) 0.313*** 0.344***
(0.082) (0.078)
Interview Sunday*Evening (d) -0.202* -0.194*
(0.106) (0.109)
Interview Week 40 (d) 0.162*** 0.162***
(0.058) (0.059)
Interview Week 41 (d) 0.133*** 0.159***
(0.031) (0.031)
Interview Week 42 (d) 0.098*** 0.105***
(0.027) (0.028)






Civil Union (d) 0.400***
(0.071)
GPA - second tercile (d) 0.066***
(0.021)
GPA - top tercile (d) -0.023
(0.020)
Controls for Father's educ and Per cap Income Not Sign Not Sign
Controls for Distance to college and Tuition Not Sign Not Sign
State ¯xed e®ects Yes Yes
Observations 3680 3680
Log likelihood -2483.362 -2376.194
P-value: Test of joint signi¯cance 0.000 0.000
Excl. categories: Interview on Monday, Interview in the morning, Interview in week 43,
male, single, lowest GPA tercile, father's education primary or less, per capita income less
than 5000 pesos, distance to college less than 20 kilometers, tuition less than 750 pesos.
56Table 12: Probit model for the college attendance decision using the adolescent sample and cor-
recting for sample selection.
Dependent Variable: Attend College Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Marg. E®./(S.E.) Marg. E®./(S.E.) Marg. E®./(S.E.)
Expected Return to College 0.081** 0.077** 0.074**
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
Prob of Work - HS 0.029 0.010 -0.009
(0.083) (0.084) (0.073)
Prob of Work - College 0.043 0.030 0.032
(0.096) (0.097) (0.084)
Var of Log Earn - HS -2.264 -2.917 -2.750
(1.803) (1.927) (1.784)
Var of Log Earn - College -0.015 0.157 0.452
(2.260) (2.286) (1.995)
GPA - second tercile (d) 0.044 0.034
(0.031) (0.028)
GPA - top tercile (d) 0.170*** 0.149***
(0.031) (0.040)
Father's educ - junior HS (d) 0.100** 0.068*
(0.040) (0.039)
Father's educ - HS (d) 0.191*** 0.131*
(0.074) (0.073)
Father's educ - Univ (d) 0.524*** 0.575***
(0.125) (0.147)
Per cap Income - 5 to 10k (d) 0.040
(0.029)
Per cap Income - more than 10k (d) 0.105***
(0.040)
Closest university 20 to 40km (d) -0.066**
(0.027)
Closest university more than 40km (d) -0.096***
(0.031)
Tuition of closest university more than 750 pesos (d) -0.097**
(0.041)
State, Gender, Marital status dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3680 3680 3680
Log likelihood -3290.394 -3261.734 -3229.325
P-value: Test of joint signi¯cance 0.001 0.000 0.000
Sample sel: Correlation between error terms -0.534 -0.351 0.002
P-value of LR test of indep eqns 0.057 0.299 0.995
Notes: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
Excl. categories: male, single, lowest GPA tercile, father's education primary or less, per capita parental income
less than 5000 pesos, distance to closest university less than 20 kilometers, tuition costs less than 750 pesos.
57Table 13: Probit model for the college attendance decision with sample selection correction: Dif-
ferential e®ect of distance to university for di®erent per capita parental income categories.
Dependent Variable: Attend College Model 4 Model 5
Marg. E®./(S.E.) Marg. E®./(S.E.)
Univ 20 - 40km * Pcap Income < 5k (d) -0.063** -0.063**
(0.030) (0.029)
Univ 20 - 40km * Pcap Income 5 - 10k (d) -0.041 -0.043
(0.036) (0.035)
Univ 20 - 40km * Pcap Income > 10k (d) 0.017 0.011
(0.049) (0.046)
Univ > 40km * Pcap Income < 5k (d) -0.043 -0.044
(0.029) (0.028)
Univ > 40km * Pcap Income 5 - 10k (d) -0.095*** -0.096***
(0.037) (0.035)
Univ > 40km * Pcap Income > 10k (d) -0.033 -0.033
(0.048) (0.045)
Expected Return to College 0.053*
(0.028)
Exp Log Earn - HS -0.010
(0.020)
Prob of Work - HS -0.003
(0.055)
Prob of Work - College 0.044
(0.065)
Var of Log Earn - HS -2.047
(1.375)
Var of Log Earn - College 0.154
(1.513)
Per cap Income - 5 to 10k (d) 0.061* 0.061*
(0.032) (0.031)
Per cap Income - more than 10k (d) 0.095** 0.092**
(0.041) (0.041)
Controls for Ability and Father's educ Yes Yes
State, Gender, Marital status dummies Yes Yes
Observations 3680 3680
Log likelihood -3253.562 -3247.898
P-value: Test of joint signi¯cance 0.000 0.000
Sample sel: correlation between error terms 0.282 0.328
P-value of LR test of indep eqns 0.308 0.243
Notes: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable
from 0 to 1. Excl. categories: male, single, lowest GPA tercile, father's education
primary or less, per capita parental income less than 5000 pesos, distance to closest
university less than 20 kilometers.
58Table 14: Probit model for college attendance decision with sample selection correction: Di®erential
e®ect of tuition costs for di®erent per capita parental income categories.
Dependent Variable: Attend College Model 6 Model 7
Marg. E®./(S.E.) Marg. E®./(S.E.)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income < 5k (d) -0.012 -0.016
(0.028) (0.027)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income 5 - 10k (d) -0.019 -0.022
(0.036) (0.035)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income > top (d) 0.065 0.061
(0.054) (0.052)
Univ 20 - 40km * Pcap Income < 5k (d) -0.060** -0.059**
(0.030) (0.029)
Univ 20 - 40km * Pcap Income 5 - 10k (d) -0.044 -0.046
(0.036) (0.035)
Univ 20 - 40km * Pcap Income > 10k (d) 0.024 0.018
(0.050) (0.047)
Univ > 40km * Pcap Income < 5k (d) -0.042 -0.042
(0.029) (0.028)
Univ > 40km * Pcap Income 5 - 10k (d) -0.094** -0.096***
(0.037) (0.036)
Univ > 40km * Pcap Income > 10k (d) -0.032 -0.032
(0.048) (0.046)
Expected Return to College 0.052*
(0.028)
Per cap Income - 5 to 10k (d) 0.066* 0.068*
(0.039) (0.039)
Per cap Income - more than 10k (d) 0.064 0.063
(0.043) (0.042)
Controls for Prob of Work, Exp and Var of Log Earn - HS Yes Yes
Controls for Ability and Father's educ Yes Yes
State, Gender, Marital status dummies Yes Yes
Observations 3680 3680
Log likelihood -3252.215 -3246.406
P-value: Test of joint signi¯cance 0.000 0.000
Sample sel: correlation between error terms 0.289 0.331
P-value of LR test of indep eqns 0.303 0.247
Notes: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. (d) for discrete change of dummy from 0 to 1.
Excl. categories: male, single, lowest GPA tercile, father's education primary or less,
per capita parental income less than 5000 pesos, distance to closest university less
than 20 kilometers, tuition costs less than 750 pesos.
59Table 15: Probit model for college attendance decision with sample selection correction: Di®erential
e®ect of tuition costs for poor high expected return individuals.
Dependent Variable: Attend College Model 8 Model 9
Marg. E®./(S.E.) Marg. E®./(S.E.)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income < 5k (d) -0.030 0.037
(0.031) (0.045)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income < 5k * Exp Return high (d) -0.110**
(0.044)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income 5 - 10k (d) -0.022 -0.052
(0.043) (0.051)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income 5 - 10k * Exp Return high (d) 0.054
(0.075)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income > top (d) 0.068 0.031
(0.060) (0.076)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Pcap Income > 10k * Exp Return high (d) 0.050
(0.090)
Expected Return to College 0.075**
(0.035)
Per cap Income - 5 to 10k (d) 0.056 0.055
(0.035) (0.035)
Per cap Income - more than 10k (d) 0.096** 0.093**
(0.042) (0.041)
Controls for Prob of Work, Exp and Var of Log Earn - HS Yes Yes
Controls for Ability and Father's educ Yes Yes
State, Gender, Marital status dummies Yes Yes
Observations 3680 3680
Log likelihood -3247.959 -3238.761
P-value: Test of joint signi¯cance 0.000 0.000
Sample sel: correlation between error terms 0.092 0.131
P-value of LR test of indep eqns 0.751 0.649
Notes: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. (d) for discrete change of dummy from 0 to 1.
Excl. categories: male, single, lowest GPA tercile, father's education primary or less, per capita parental
income less than 5000 pesos, distance to closest university less than 20 kilometers, tuition costs less than
750 pesos.
60Table 16: Probit model for college attendance decision using the full sample: Di®erential e®ect of
tuition costs for di®erent quartiles of parental income and wealth.
Dependent Variable: Attend College Model 1 Model 2
Marg. E®./(S.E.) Marg. E®./(S.E.)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Par income/wealth quart 1 (d) -0.116*** -0.047
(0.028) (0.046)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Par income/wealth quart 1 * Exp Return high (d) -0.128***
(0.048)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Par income/wealth quart 2 (d) -0.032 0.000
(0.040) (0.054)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Par income/wealth quart 2 * Exp Return high (d) -0.057
(0.055)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Par income/wealth quart 3 (d) -0.059 -0.041
(0.038) (0.053)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Par income/wealth quart 3 * Exp Return high (d) -0.034
(0.061)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Par income/wealth quart 4 (d) 0.072 0.058
(0.045) (0.064)
Tuition > 750 pesos * Par income/wealth quart 4 * Exp Return high (d) 0.019
(0.070)
Expected Return to College 0.069*** 0.085***
(0.024) (0.025)
Var of Log Earn - College -2.859* -2.901*
(1.573) (1.573)
Par income/wealth quart 2 (d) -0.006 -0.006
(0.028) (0.028)
Par income/wealth quart 3 (d) 0.050* 0.050*
(0.028) (0.028)
Par income/wealth quart 4 (d) 0.082*** 0.083***
(0.028) (0.028)
Controls for Prob of Work, Exp and Var of Log Earn - HS Yes Yes
Controls for Ability and Father's educ Yes Yes
State, Gender, Marital status dummies Yes Yes
Observations 3680 3680
Log likelihood -2145.797 -2142.660
P-value: Test of joint signi¯cance 0.000 0.000
Notes: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. (d) for discrete change of dummy from 0 to 1.
Excl. categories: male, single, lowest GPA tercile, father's education primary or less, lowest parental income/
wealth quartile, distance to closest university less than 20 kilometers, tuition costs less than 750 pesos.
61Table 17: Expected Returns: Correlation with Distance to College for Full Sample and Adolescent
Sample controlling for Self-Selection.
Dependent Variable: Expected Return Full Sample Adolescent Sample
Coe®./(S.E.) Coe®./(S.E.)
Distance to closest university 0.002*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Distance squared -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
GPA - second tercile 0.012 0.044**
(0.012) (0.020)
GPA - top tercile 0.032*** 0.069***
(0.012) (0.019)
Father's educ - junior HS 0.010 0.025
(0.016) (0.025)
Father's educ - HS 0.060* 0.084*
(0.031) (0.045)
Father's educ - Univ -0.006 -0.126
(0.060) (0.115)
Per cap Income - 5 to 10k -0.005 -0.004
(0.012) (0.019)
Per cap Income - more than 10k 0.016 0.005
(0.014) (0.021)
State, gender, marital status dummies Yes Yes
Observations (censored) 3493 3493 (1916)
Lambda -0.028
S.E. of Lambda 0.054
Notes: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Excl.
categories: male, single, lowest GPA tercile, father's education primary or less, per capita expenditures less
than 5000 pesos, and per capita income less than 5000 pesos, no university in municipality of residence.
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